- EAN13
- 9782940503087
- Éditeur
- Graduate Institute Publications
- Date de publication
- 21/08/2012
- Collection
- eCahiers de l’Institut
- Langue
- anglais
- Fiches UNIMARC
- S'identifier
The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
Theory and Empirics
Sebastian Hohmann
Graduate Institute Publications
eCahiers de l’Institut
Livre numérique
-
Aide EAN13 : 9782940503087
- Fichier PDF, libre d'utilisation
- Fichier EPUB, libre d'utilisation
- Fichier Mobipocket, libre d'utilisation
- Lecture en ligne, lecture en ligne
2.99
What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of
supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign
defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly
indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem
for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic
sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise
social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The political-economy model of
sovereign default developed in this ePaper shows that those governments that
depend on small groups of loyalists drawn from large populations are more
likely to default on sovereign debt than those governments dependent on large
groups of supporters. These findings contribute to a growing body of
literature on the importance of institutions in sovereign debt and default.
supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign
defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly
indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem
for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic
sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise
social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The political-economy model of
sovereign default developed in this ePaper shows that those governments that
depend on small groups of loyalists drawn from large populations are more
likely to default on sovereign debt than those governments dependent on large
groups of supporters. These findings contribute to a growing body of
literature on the importance of institutions in sovereign debt and default.
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